THE 1974 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT
AMENDMENTS: THE SHORTCOMINGS
OF GOOD INTENTIONS
JOEL L.
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After six decades of basically unchanged and substantially inef-

fective campaign finance regulation,' Congress and the President managed in 1971 to agree on reform, embodying it in the Federal Election

Campaign Act' and the Revenue Act of 1971. 3 Using information
which would not have been available absent the Campaign Act's greatly
strengthened provisions for supervision and enforcement 4 of the contri-

bution and expenditure reporting requirements, 5 resourceful journalists
and governmental investigators were able to discover a variety of illegal

contributions to the 1972 presidential campaign chests" and to trace
Republican campaign payments to the participants in the Watergate

break-in. 7 It is therefore not particularly far-fetched to view the 1971
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, amending Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 [hereinafter cited as 1974 Amendments];
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Campaign Act];
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VII-VIlI, 85 Stat. 560-74, as amended
by 1974 Amendments [hereinafter cited as Revenue Act];
Fleishman, Public Financingof Election Campaigns: Constitutional Constraintson
Steps Toward Equality of Political Influence of Citizens, 52 N.C.L. REV. 349 (1973
[hereinafter cited as Public Financing];
Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REV. 389 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Freedom of Speech].
1. See H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN PoLInCs (1972); Freedom of Speech at 403-04.
2. 1971 Campaign Act.
3. Revenue Act.
4. 1971 Campaign Act §§ 104(a) (3) (C), 105, 301(g).
5. Id. §§ 302, 304.
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (3M Company acknowledges
illegal political fund); id., Dec. 31, 1974, at 1, col. 2 (Ashland Oil Inc. admits $170,000
in illegal gifts); id., Oct. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 2 (Northrop Corporation official admits
to secret political slush fund used to support President Nixon and others).
7. See id., July 17, 1973, at 1, col. 4 ($220,000 raised by Kalmbach for seven Watergate defendants); id., July 19, 1973, at 1, col. 2 ($450,000 funneled to Watergate defendants and lawyers); id., May 18, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1 (summary).
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Campaign Act as partially responsible for causing the eventual resignation of President Nixon."
The cause-and-effect relationship, however, is not nearly as strong
as the connection between the Watergate events, including the resignation, and the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. 9
But for the embarrassing and widening wake of Watergate-the plethora of illegal corporate campaign contributions,1 ° the illegal sale of
high office in return for contributions,"' among others-there would
very likely have been no new campaign finance reforms in 1974, much
less any which constituted so drastic an innovation as, for example, the
provision of compulsory 100 percent public financing for major party
candidates in presidential general elections, 2 and optional public financing for presidential primary campaigns.' 3 Coming only two
months after the Nixon resignation and so obviously a prescription for
the ills which are generally perceived as having caused Watergate, the
1974 Amendments constituted Congress's first, and thus far only successful, attempt to give practical vent to the shame and guilt aroused
by the whole sorry spectacle. Congressman Bill Frenzel was undoubtedly speaking for his colleagues when, in commenting on the
amendments, he explained: "We couldn't go back to the American
people and tell them that we had no answer to the abuses that they
had seen. This is our answer, and we have to make it work." 4
The trouble is that indignation and outrage, while frequently
necessary to energize legislative action, are rarely the most favorable
auspices for constructive, carefully considered lasting change. And
that is even more the case when the legislative subject matter is one
in which every member of Congress has a direct personal interest and
with which fiost Congressmen are always slow to tamper-this time
8. The greater accessibility of financial reports filed by candidates for Congress,
coupled with the constant monitoring of the reporting process and prodding of Common
Cause, has also led for the first time in history to the prosecution of several members
of Congress for violations of the reporting requirements.
Feb. 20, 1975,
at 10, col. 3.
9. 1974 Amendments.
10. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975, 1§4, at 4, col. 1 (summary of illegal corporate campaign funding);
Jan. 5, 1975, § 4, at 2, col. 2 (3M and Ashland admit illegal contributions);
July 24, 1974, at 1, col. 1 (illegal gifts by milk cooperative);
Nov.
14, 1973, at 32, col. 6 (Gulf Oil and Ashland plead guilty to illegal corporate contributions).
11.
July 2, 1975, at 12, col. 1;
Mar. 17, 1974, § 1, at 47, col. 3;
Mar.
14, 1973, at 20, col. 3.
12. 1974 Amendments § 404.
13. Id. § 408.
14. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, at 36, col. 1.
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even more so since three years earlier they overhauled electoral finance
regulation for the first time in more than half a century.
Under such circumstances, the outcome was predictable: the
change most necessary on the least painful terms. While the amendments embody important reforms, they are cast in the most politically
palatable forms and are scarred by the pulling and hauling of legislative battles. Surely as well-intentioned as any legislation could be, the
1974 Amendments unfortunately are seriously flawed in important respects.
On January 2, 1975, the first day after the amendments became
effective,' 5 their constitutionality was broadly challenged in an unusual
court action brought by plaintiffs from both ends of the political spectrum--Senator James Buckley of New York and former Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, together with others.'" It is a challenge
which aims not only, and perhaps not chiefly, at invalidating the flawed
provisions of the 1974 Amendments, but also, and most unfortunately,
at what appears to be the valid regulatory conceptions which underlie
them. In passing upon the issues, as it almost surely will, the Supreme
Court would be well advised to take great care in separating the two
kinds of questions. An overly broad pronouncement of unconstitutionality could make regulation of campaign finance impossible for
years to come. The other extreme-rationalization of the legislation's
shortcomings in the name of a public response to Watergate-is equally
undesirable. The character of political financing is far too important
to the long-term survival and healthy functioning of democracy for the
Court to allow the passions and pressures of the moment to perpetuate
what appear to be seriously faulty modes of dealing with it.
15. Id., Jan. 2, 1975, at 27, col. 1.
16. Other plaintiffs include Congressman William Steiger of Wisconsin, Stewart R.
Mott, the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency, the Conservative Party of the State
of New York, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union,
and Human Events, Inc. See id., May 19, 1975, at 1, col. 7; id., Jan. 20, 1975, at 18,
col. 6.
In order to expedite decision and Supreme Court review before subsidy payments
start being made to candidates for the presidential nomination on January 1, 1976, the
District Court certified the proceeding to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a procedure specified by section 208 of the 1974 Amendments (codified at 2

U.S.C. § 437(h)).

On April 14, the Court of Appeals, en banc, ordered the District

Court to make findings of fact and certify constitutional questions to it, which the Dis-

trict Court completed on May 19, 1975. See Buckley v. Valeo, 1975).

F. Supp. -

(D.D.C.

The Court of Appeals then held arguments, en banc, and rendered its decision

on August 15, 1975. See Civil Action No. 75-1061. The case is now on appeal to the
Supreme Court.
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Disclosureof Contributionsand Expenditures
The 1974 Amendments made no significant changes in the Campaign Act's reporting and disclosure provisions.' 7 Minor revisions
worthy of notice included lifting from $10 to an aggregate of $100 the
threshold at which the occupation and principal place of business of
a contributor must be reported.' 8 Moreover, to reinforce the accountability of each candidate for conforming to the new overall expenditure
limitations,' the new law requires a candidate to consolidate in single
reports all receipts, disbursements, and transfers by all political committees supporting his candidacy. 0 To facilitate the discharge of that
responsibility, reports of political committees, other than a candidate's
designated principal campaign committee, are to be made to the principal committee 2' rather than directly to the supervisory officer for the
particular category of election, as heretofore, or to the newly established Federal Election Commission. 22 The burden to report all required information on contributions and expenditures is thereby shifted
to a candidate's principal campaign committee. Finally, the 1974
Amendments require that reports be made to the Federal Election
Commission by anyone who contributes or expends more than $100
in behalf of a federal candidacy other than by direct contribution to
a candidate or political committee, 23 and by anyone, "other than an individual," 24 who explicitly or implicitly urges the public to elect or defeat a candidate for federal office, with the exception of bona fide reporting or editorializing by broadcasters, newspapers, magazines, or
other periodicals. 5
At the present time, then, the law requires all political committees
which expect to receive or expend $1000 in a calendar year to register with the Federal Election Commission, 2 to keep detailed records
of contributions of $10 or more2 7 and of all expenditures, 28 and to re17. For a description of the reporting and disclosure provision in the 1971 Campaign Act, see Freedom of Speech at 393-99.
18. 1974 Amendments §§ 202(a), 204(b) (3).
19. See text accompanying notes 63-95 infra.
20. Id.§ 204(b)(4).
21. Id.§§ 202(b), 203, 204(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(f), 433(e), 434(a)).
22. Under the 1971 Campaign Act, the supervisory officers were the Comptroller
General for presidential races, the Secretary of the Senate for Senate races, and the
Clerk of the House for House races. 1971 Campaign Act § 301(g).
23. 1974 Amendments § 204(c) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(d), (e)).
24. Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437(a)).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 203, 208(c) (3) (codified at 2U.S.C. § 433).
27. Id. § 202(a) (2), (3) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 432(c) (1), (2)).
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port periodically to the Federal Election Commission the amounts and
exact nature of all receipts and disbursements, including the names,
mailing addresses, occupation, and principal place of business of contributors of $100 or more, as well as an identification of all those to
whom expenditures of $100 or more have been made, along with a
detailed explanation of the expenditures.29 And the statutory disclosure scheme comes full circle with the reporting requirements newly
imposed on independent actors, as described above. 0
Limitationson Contributions

Prior to the 1971 Campaign Act, there had been for thirty years
a $5000 annual limit on the aggregate amount of contributions to federal election campaigns,31 which had been easy to evade because the
statutory language encouraged an interpretation of the limit as applying
in the aggregate to contributions to any single political committee.
One might legally contribute, therefore, the $5000 maximum to as
many different committees on behalf of the same candidate as one
wished. 2
The 1971 Campaign Act repealed this totally ineffective contribution limitation, substituting for it a new, but much narrower, ceiling on
the amount which might be contributed to a campaign by a candidate
or his immediate family.3 3 The newer provision was retained in the
1974 Amendments and broadened to include loans within the definition of contributions. 4 But the 1974 reform went much further, imposing a $1000 ceiling on any individual's contributions, 3 and a $5000
ceiling on any committee's contributions 6 to any single federal candidate in any single election,3 7 as well as a $25,000 ceiling on any individ28. Id. § 202(a) (2) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 432(c) (3), (4)).

29. Id. § 204(b) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)).
30. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.

31. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
32. A. HEARD, THE CosTs OF DEmOCRACY 347-50 (1960).

33. 1971 Campaign Act § 203, amending 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970). "Family" is defined to include a spouse, child, parent, grandparent, brother or sister, and the spouses
of such persons. The ceilings imposed were $50,000 in a presidential or vice presidential
campaign, $35,000 in a Senatorial campaign, and $25,000 in a House campaign.
34. 1974 Amendments § 101(b)(2) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3), (4)
(1975)).
35. Id. § 1O1(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1)).
36. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2)).
37. The limits apply separately, therefore, to each stage of the election-primary,
run-off primary, and general--except that all primary elections for president in any single year are regarded as one election for purposes of this contribution ceiling. Id. §
101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (5)).
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ual's aggregate federal election contributions in any calendar year. 8
Several additional provisions were added to reinforce the stringent

new contribution limitations-one limiting contributions in currency to
$100 or less," a second requiring earmarked contributions through in-

termediary organizations to be treated as contributions directly to the
candidate earmarked, 40 and a third prohibiting foreign nationals from
making any contributions at all. 4 ' Finally, the 1974 Amendments significantly increased to at least $25,000 the maximum penalties for
violation of all contribution limitations, whether new or pre-existing. 42
Limitations on Expenditures
The ineffective4 3 pre-exdsting limitations on the amounts of campaign expenditures were replaced in 1971 by ceilings on each federal
candidate's aggregate expenditures for communications media. 4 This

first step towards candidate accountability 45 -making

each candidate

accountable for all expenditures on his behalf-was followed by an-

other and even larger one in the 1974 Amendments, which broadened
the expenditure limitations beyond communications media alone to include all campaign expenditures. 40

Without such candidate responsi-

bility for all expenditures on his behalf and under his control, expenditure limitations would not effectively limit.

The 1974 Amendments,

recognizing this, reinforce campaign centralization by requiring each
federal candidate to designate a principal campaign committee 4r and
38. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3)).
39. Id. § 101(f)(1) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 615(a)).
40. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (6)).
41. Id. § 101 (a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 613). The 1974 Amendments expanded
the previous ban on contributions by agents of foreign principals into one prohibiting
contributions by any foreign nationals.
42. Id. § 101 (e) (1) (corporations, labor unions, and national banks); § 101(e) (2)
(government contractors); § 101(e)(3) (foreign nationals); § 101(a) (general contribution and expenditure limitations).
43. Like contribution limitations they were ineffective because they applied to each
political committee's expenditures, rather than to the aggregate of expenditures of all
committees supporting a particular candidate. There was no limit on the number of
committees a candidate could legally have. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying
text.
44. 1971 Campaign Act § 103, 104.
45. The 1971 Campaign Act, see id. § 302, reinforced the inclination toward candidate accountability by requiring the designation of a chairman and treasurer and insisting on their approval, or that of their designated agents, of the receipt of all contributions and the making of all expenditures.
46, 1974 Amendments § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)).
47. Id. § 202(b) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 432(f)).
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official campaign depositories. 48
The ceilings imposed, which apply separately to each election

stage 49-primary,

run-off, and general-except in presidential elec-

tions, vary from office to office. Candidates for the presidential nomi-

nation may spend an aggregate of no more than $10 million in all
stages of the nomination process, and, in any single state, no more than
twice what a candidate for the United States Senate nomination may

legally spend in that state. 0 In the general election for president, each
presidential/vice-presidential candidate team 1 may spend no more than
52
$20 million.
Expenditure limitations in races for Congress are computed differently. A candidate for a senatorial nomination or for nomination
to the House of Representatives in a single-district state may spend
the greater of either eight cents per person of voting age or $100,000.13
In the general election for the Senate, or a state-wide House seat, the
expenditure limitation is the greater of either twelve cents per person
of voting age or $150,000.4 Other candidates for nomination or elec-

tion to the House of Representatives may spend $70,00015 at each
stage of the election, except those seeking to be Delegate from Guam
or the Virgin Islands, who are limited to only $15,000.6
These are only the base limitations and are augmented statutorily
in several ways. First of all, a candidate may spend an additional
87
twenty percent of his expenditure limitation on fund-raising costs.

48. Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437(c)). British law has long required
absolute candidate accountability, see Representation of the People Act, 11 & 12 Geo.
VI, c. 65 § 42(1) (1948), even to the point of forbidding campaign activity by independent actors. The State of Florida was the first state to adopt a mandatory treasurer
and campaign depository statute in the United States, see Law of June 5, 1951, ch.
26819, [1951] Fla. Laws 631, superseded by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.021 (1974), which
has apparently been quite effective. See Roady, Ten Years of Florida's"Who Gave ItWho Got It" Law, 27 LAw & CoNTEMp. PRoB. 434 (1962).
49. 1974 Amendments § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(3)).
50. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(A)).
51. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (2) (A)).
52. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(B)).
53. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(C)).
54. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(D)).
55. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1) (E)).
56. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)(F)).
57. Id. § 102(d) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591(f) (4) (H)). Political committees,
apparently contributing to many different candidates, see id. § 101(a) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 608(b)(2)), may spend an unlimited amount of money in raising funds, so
long as television, radio, newspapers, or other advertising directed to the public is not
used for that purpose, id. § 102(d) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591(f)(4)(I)). Since there
is no limit on the aggregate amount which such political committees can spend or raise
anyway, one must wonder to what end subsection (I) was included in the Amendments.
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These ceilings are lifted again in a second way, because national and
state party committees may spend a limited amount on behalf of individual candidates in addition to what the candidate himself may
spend."' The national party committees, for example, may spend two
cents per person of voting age on behalf of their presidential/vicepresidential candidate teams." Both the national party and a state
party may each spend the greater of two cents per person of voting
age or $20,000 on behalf of their candidates for the Senate or a single
state-wide House seat,10 and $10,000 on behalf of each candidate for
the House of Representatives. 1 In effect, then, the true minimum expenditure limitation in a general election would be $220,000 rather
than $150,000 in a Senate race, 62 and $104,000, rather than $70,000,
in a House race. Moreover, the Amendments provide for an annual
cost-of-living increase in all of the limitations, including the party supplements, to reflect increases in the consumer price index, calculated
on a 1974 base period. 3
These expenditure ceilings are further increased, in effect, by
various kinds of expenditures which the 1974 Amendments exempt
from the definition of either "expenditures" or "contributions," or both.
When an individual entertains for a candidate, in the individual's own
home, the real costs of invitations, food, and beverages, and the imputed costs for the use of the real or personal property involved do
not count toward either the candidate's expenditure limitation0 4 or the
donor's contribution ceiling," up to a maximum of $500.6 Moreover,
when an unpaid, volunteer campaign worker spends his own funds for
travel on behalf of a candidate, and is not reimbursed, up to $500 of
those travel costs are treated neither as candidate expenditures nor as
individual contributionsY7
In addition to expenditure limits on candidates and party committees, the 1974 Amendments impose an annual aggregate of $1000 on
direct expenditures on behalf of, or in opposition to, a clearly identified
58. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f) (1)).
59. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(c)(2), (f)(2)).
60. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f)(3)(A)).
61. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f)(3)(B)).
62. To the base of $150,000, add 207o or $30,000 for fund-raising costs, and
$20,000 each from both the national and state committees.
63. 1974 Amendments § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(d)).
64. Id. § 201(a) (5) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591(f) (4) (D)).
65. Id. § 201(a) (4) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591(e) (5) (B)).
66. Id. § 201(a)(5) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591(f)(4)); id. § 201(a)(4) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 591(e) (5)).
67. Id. § 201(a)(5) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591(f) (4) (E)); id. § 201(a)(4) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591 (e) (5) (D)).
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candidate by a person acting independently of the candidate.6 9 In
other words, this limitation permits individuals not under the control
of, or in concert with, a candidate on his campaign1 0 to buy up to
$1000 of advertising a year advocating the election or defeat of a candi-

date, apparently without limit on the number of elections in which an
individual may so intervene. Nor is there any limitation on the aggregate amount of expenditures permitted to any independently acting individual in any single year, analogous to the $25,000 ceiling on aggre-

gate contributions to all federal candidates. 1'
Public Subsidizationof FederalElections

The Revenue Act of 197172 had provided the first operating federal subsidization of political campaigns, 7 which took three forms: 1)

a tax deduction for political contributions, 74 2) a tax credit for political
contributions, 7 and 3) cash grants in support of presidential general
elections19 6 drawn out of a fund-the Presidential Election Campaign

Fund-accumulated from a one or two dollar check-off on individual
or joint personal income tax forms.77

Under the 1974 Amendments,

these three subsidies 78 remain substantially intact, although the formula
by which allocations are made from the Presidential Election Campaign

Fund is completely revised.79

Instead of a major party entitlement

68. Defined by the statute, id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (2) (A)),
as involving publicity on which the candidate's name, photograph, or drawing appears,
or from which the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference.
69. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)).
70. If candidate control were present, the expenditure would have to be counted towards the candidate's own expenditure ceiling, and the direct expenditure would be regarded as a campaign contribution, which explains why both the individual contribution
limitation and independent expenditure ceiling are at the same level, $1000.
71. 1974 Amendments § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3)).
72. Revenue Act
73. The Congress passed the Long Act, see Pub. L. No. 89-809, tit. II § 302(a),
80 Stat. 1587, in 1966, providing a tax check-off and presidential election subsidy similar
to the 1971 Act, but it never went into effect. See H. ALExAr~Nm, supra note 1, at
218-24.
74. Revenue Act § 702 (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 218).
75. Id. § 701 (codified at INr. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 41).
76. Id. tit. VII.
77. Id. § 802, amending IN'r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6096.
78. Professor Surrey's view of tax benefits as subsidies, see Surrey, Tax Incentives
as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970), which seemed for a time to have become "conventional wisdom," has recently been coming under severe attack. See Kristol, Taxes, Poverty and Equality, 37 THE PuB. Ihmn.sr 3 (1974); N.Y. Times, June
1, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 61-62 (letter by Kristol).
79. For a concise description of these three subsidies as originally enacted, see Freedom of Speech at 397-99.
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based on fifteen cents per person of voting age,80 each major party
presidential candidate is now to receive cash grants up to the level of

the expenditure ceilings established for presidential general elections, 8 '
which will be $20 million in 1976.

A minor party, defined as in the

1971 Revenue Act as a party whose candidate for president in the
preceding election received between five and twenty-five percent of

all votes cast in that election,82 will continue to receive that proportion
of the Campaign Fund payments to major parties which its vote total
bears to the average of the votes cast for the major party candidates: 3
Election Fund Payment to Minor Party

Popular Vote for Minor Party

Election Fund Payment to Major Party

Average Vote for Major Party

The principal 1974 reform in the presidential election subsidy was

the creation of grants for primary election campaigns,"4 also to be financed out of funds accumulated from the income tax check-off. In
order to qualify for the subsidy, an aspirant for a party's presidential
nomination must raise $5000 in each of twenty states in contributions
no larger than $250 each.8

Once qualified for the subsidy, a candi-

date will be entitled to receive one federal dollar for each dollar raised
from individual contributors, up to a maximum of $250 per contributor, 0 and an aggregate ceiling of $5 million. 1
In addition to these changes, the 1974 Amendments established
for the first time a federal subsidy to political parties to finance their
nominating conventions.8 8 Major parties will receive $2 million
each,8 ° with the stipulation that they are not to spend more than that

sum on the conventions."

A minor party is entitled to a sum com-

80. Revenue Act § 801 (codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9004(a) (1)).
81. 1974 Amendments § 404(a) (codified at INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 9004
(a)(1)).
82. Revenue Act § 801 (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9002(7)).
83. Id. § 801 (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9004(a)(2)(A)); see §
9004(a) (2) (B) (slight variation in formula to be used when minor party presidential
candidate in current election is same as its candidate in preceding election).
84. 1974 Amendments § 408 (codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, H8 9031-42).
85. Id. § 408(c) (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9033(b) (3), (4)).
86. Id. § 408(c) (codified at IN-r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9034(a)).
87. Id. § 408(c) (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9034(b)).
88. Id. § 406(a) (codified at INTr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9008).
89. Id. § 406(a) (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9008(b)(1)).
90. Id. § 406(a) (codified at INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9008(d)(1)). The wording
of the law does not make clear whether parties are permitted to continue the longstanding practice of choosing one city over another as the convention site substantially on
the basis of services contributed free by buginesses. Are such contributions legal, and,
if so, are they to be counted toward the ceiling? The Federal Election Commission has
now decided that, so long as such gifts are made to a fund assembled by a local non-
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puted exactly as its entitlement to the presidential general election
subsidy is calculated9 -that proportion of the major party convention
subsidy as its vote bears to the average of the major party vote in the
preceding presidential election. 2
Like the major parties, a minor
party, in order to receive the convention subsidy, must agree to spend
no more on its convention than a major party is permitted to spend,
or $2 million. 93 The convention expenditure ceilings for both major
and minor parties can be waived by the Federal Election Commission
if "extraordinary and unforeseen" circumstances arise. 4
Supervisory and Enforcement Mechanisms
It has long been contended9 5 that the principal flaw in election
campaign financing was the lack of any entity charged with supervision
and enforcement of election finance laws. Prior to 1971, campaign
financial reports were required to be filed with the Clerk of the House
and the Secretary of the Senate, but no one had responsibility for following up failures to file, authority to audit such reports as were filed,
or power to punish for violations of the filing or other campaign finance
laws. The 1971 Campaign Act left supervisory authority over Senate
races with the Secretary and over House races with the Clerk, 6 but
lodged responsibility over presidential elections in the Comptroller
General of the United States.9 7 That Act also spelled out in considerable detail the duties of the supervisory officers,9 8 but it was only the
Comptroller General, through an Office of Federal Elections with a sizable staff, who responded in full measure to the statutory scheme, and
it is partially as a result of his faithfulness to the letter of the law that
much of the information about 1972 presidential campaign practices
came to light.
The 1974 Amendments, in creating the Federal Election Commission, moved monitoring and enforcement of campaign finance laws
profit organization for use by the party convention, they are permitted and will not
count toward the $2,000,000 expenditure ceiling. See N.Y. Times, July 10, 1975, at 11,
col. 1.
91. See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
92. 1974 Amendments § 406(a) (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9008
(b)(2)).
93. Id. (codified at INT.REv.CODE OF 1954, § 9008(d)(2)).
94. Id. (codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9008 (d)(3)).
95. See, e.g., H. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 190; PRESiDENT'S COmMISSION ON
CAMPAIGN CosTs, FINANCING PRESMENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 21 (1962); Lindsay, The Politi-

cal Money Machine, 12 MiDwEsT Q. 41, 46-47 (1970).
96. 1971 Campaign Act § 301(g).

97. Id.
98. Id. § 308.
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into an entirely new era. For the first time in the nation's history,
there exists a single entity with a mandate to insure that campaigns for
all federal offices are carried on in accordance with the laws that are
supposed to govern them. Unlike the supervisory officers under the
1971 Campaign Act, 99 the Federal Election Commission is charged
with taking initiatives if required reports are not filed, if additional information is desired, or if violations of law are suspected, and it is
amply endowed with statutory powers to pursue its mission. 100 It can
compel the attendance of witnesses, 01 subpoena documents,"0 2 require
special reports, 0 3 make rules with the effect of law,' 0 4 and initiate civil
proceedings in its own name, 10 5 as well as receive the aid of the Attorney General in prosecuting its complaints. 06
The Commission is comprised of the Secretary of the Senate, the
Clerk of the House, two members appointed by the President pro ternpore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the
President. 0 7 The appointments of the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House are required to be made upon
the recommendation of the majority and minority leaders in the respective houses. All six appointees are subject to confirmation by both
Houses of Congress. 08 In order to ensure bipartisanship, the Act requires different party affiliations within each set of two appointments.' 00

These are the principal components of existing law regulating
election financing. As one might expect, there are constitutional issues at nearly every point, and we now proceed to examine them
against the entire legal context in which they arise.
FmST

AMENDMENT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE

1974 AMENDMENTS
The Frameworkfor Examining First Amendment Claims
Politics is democracy's principal means of choosing those who are
to govern. As such, it constitutes the arena in which most funda99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. § 308(d)(1).
1974 Amendments § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. H9 437d, 437g).
Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a) (3)).
Id.
Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a) (1)).
Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a) (8)).
Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a) (6), 437g(a) (5)).
Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (7)).
Id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (1)).
Id.

109. Id.
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mental choices of governmental policy are shaped, if not actually made.
In that arena, candidates, private and public interest groups, and the
communications media interact with the aim of persuading the voters
of the desirability of particular candidate choices. The medium of
that interaction is speech-whether written or, spoken, whether directly
to live audiences or by means of broadcasting, whether spread at no
cost to the speaker or by means of time, space, or equipment purchased
by him or his supporters-and its chief facilitator for campaign purposes is political association. Because they are indispensable to selfgovernment in general and to informed voter choice in particular, there
is no doubt that political speech and association occupy a preferred
place among already preferred rights guaranteed by the first amendment. 1 0 Any potential infringements of their exercise are therefore
scrutinized by courts with great care.
First amendment rights, however, are not absolute,"' and despite
their exalted status, political speech and association are no exception."12 Indeed, their vulnerability to governmental constraint arises
out of just that which gives them their preferred place-their crucial
role in enabling self-government to work. There can be no elections
110. See Freedom of Speech at 409-10 for a discussion of the authority for this statement. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 635-42 (1970);
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PowERs OF THE PEOPLE
(1960); A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FNANCE: SOME CONsTrrU-

TIONAL QUESTIONS (1972); Ferman, Congressional Controls on Campaign Financing:
An Expansion or Contraction of the First Amendment?, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1972);
Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 900
(1971); Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7
HARV. CIV. RiGiTs-Crv. LiB. L. REv. 214 (1972); Developments in the Law-Elections,
88 HARv. L. Rrv. 1111, 1233-98 (1975); Comment, The Constitutionality of Restrictions on Individual Contributions to Candidatesin Federal Elections, 122 U. PA. L. Rnv.
1609 (1974).
111. At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association...
as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are "absolutes" not
only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it
must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be
gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1960) (citations omitted).
See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 (1965); Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 467, 471 (1967).
See generally Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 245, 256.
112. Civil Service Commn v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567
(1973). See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-219 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269-271 (1964).
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without rules to guide them, and, for more than a century at the federal
level, rules have been enacted," 13 and sustained by courts, 1 4 which go

beyond simple facilitation of election mechanics to regulate in detail
how candidates and their supporters might permissibly behave.

Over

the past twenty years, there has been an increasing consensus that even
broader rules should be made to govern the interaction of political actors so that socially unacceptable tactics might not be used in political
combat and factors pernicious to democracy might not unduly skew election outcomes. That consensus grows out of, and largely rests upon,
other rights guaranteed by the Constitution, principally equal protection of the laws. 1 5
This does not mean that any rules of the game which Congress
might deem appropriate would be constitutionally permissible. But it
does suggest that, contrary to first impression, political speech and association may not be as impregnable to reasonable regulation as nonpolitical speech and association may be.
What calculus, then, would the Court use in examining laws regulating this paradoxically elevated but simultaneously vulnerable area of
political speech/association against claims that they violated the first
amendment?"16 Without much question, the test is actually the same

as that applied to alleged infringements of other forms of speech pro113. Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 (requiring the election of congressmen by geographical districts); Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 245, 14 Stat. 243 (establishing
the time and mode of electing senators); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 19-22, 16
Stat. 144-46 and Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, §§ 5-6, 16 Stat. 255-56 (a comprehensive code of regulations governing the manner of conducting congressional elections, including provisions against false registration, bribery, voting without legal right, making
false returns, interfering with election officers, and so on. The entire code was repealed
in 1894, Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36.).
114. See Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See also United
States v. International Union of Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (summary
of the history of federal legislation in this area).
115. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV. There is no doubt that the measure of equal protection against federal intrusion provided by the fifth amendment is at least as great as
that provided against state action by the fourteenth amendment. "Thus, if a classification would be invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is also inconsistent with the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364-65 n.4 (1974). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
116. See Freedom of Speech at 404-09. See also, Cahn, The Firstness of the First
Amendment, 65 YALE L.J 464 (1956); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALa L.J. 464 (1969).
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tected by the first amendment. The Court first examines the governmental interest which the particular regulation is claimed to serve,
seeking to determine its legitimacy and the appropriate weight to be
assigned to it. Next the Court probes the legislative means in order
to ascertain whether the means is appropriate to the end: whether,
in fact, the means is likely to be an effective instrument for attaining
the ends. Finally, the Court searches among other conceivable means
of achieving the governmental goal to ascertain whether the legislative
means chosen is, in fact, the "least drastic alternative" available. 117 An
application of these three tests-the legitimacy and weight of the governmental objective, the appropriateness and effectiveness of the
means chosen in attaining it, and the availability of less drastic alternatives to the same end-leads to the conclusion that the 1974 Amendments contain several provisions of doubtful constitutionality.
Unfortunately for simplicity's sake, the matter cannot be left
there, and any doubts about the constitutionality must be qualified in
three very important respects. First, it is important to distinguish between constitutional flaws in principle and constitutional faults in detail. The former involve modes of regulation that inherently and irremediably infringe constitutional rights, while the latter arise out of
constitutionally faulty mechanisms for attaining constitutionally permissible regulatory goals and can be easily cured of their flaws. All but
one of the defects in the 1974 Amendments are in details rather than
in principle.
A second distinction must be made with respect to the balancing
of the governmental interests served by particular campaign finance reforms against the first amendment infringements which they entail.
Some infringements may be of only incidental nature and easily justified by a single legitimate governmental interest, while others may be
so basic in character as to be incapable of being saved by any magnitude of legitimate governmental interest, however compelling, on the
other side of the balance.
Finally, and perhaps most important in the context of constitutional analysis, the entire election reform law must be viewed as a
whole. The principal governmental objectives which campaign finance
regulations are directed at attaining-(1) diminishing the deterrence
of candidates from running for office, (2) diminishing candidates' differential advantage arising from disparate access to wealth, and (3)
117. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 343 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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diminishing contribution-based, post-election influence on policy or in
obtaining appointments to office-interact so sensitively that it is impossible, in fact, to evaluate separately the constitutionality of particular instruments for achieving them. Thus, for example, low contribution ceilings, which are designed to further the second and third
objectives, seriously undercut the first by making it difficult for candidates to get campaigns started with a small number of large contributions. Low expenditure ceilings, which are directed at the first objective, severely frustrate the second by increasing the campaign
advantage of incumbents. As we shall see, therefore, faults in one
element-such as the candidacy deterrent effect of the contribution
ceilings-may be saved by the provisions in another element, such as
public subsidization of primary elections. Because of these interdependencies, and in view of the fact that Congress enacted the various
provisions as a single, unified regulatory scheme, it would be unfair
for the Court to assess the constitutionality of component parts in isolation from other pertinent elements of the scheme. As the Court itself
has observed on several occasions in passing on laws regulating elections, it is the "laws taken as a whole" that count." 8
Disclosureof Contributionsand Expenditures
Disclosure is the least burdensome of all forms of campaign
finance regulation. It requires only that political committees register
with governmental authority, and that both committees and candidates
report specified information about the donors of contributions and the
recipients of expenditures. Such laws do not coerce particular behavior; they merely expose whatever is in their purview. We know,
however, that public exposure of the names of contributors might very
well deter contributions to unpopular or fringe candidates, or "chill the
exercise" of first amendment rights, and indeed in several recent cases
plaintiffs have alleged such a chill." 9 Moreover, as we have regrettably seen recently, even contributors to major parties may be subjected
to reprisals by a party in power,120 and consequently to a fear of making
such contributions in the first place. Nonetheless, disclosure requirements, if reasonably and narrowly drafted, are surely constitutional.' 2 '
118. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 437 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 34 (1968).
119. United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1199
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
120. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 1, col. 5; id., June 28, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
121. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Burroughs & Cannon v.
United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Pro-
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Resting on the premise that "sunlight is the best disinfectant,"' 1 2
disclosure laws have the objective of providing voters and the press

with information about who is supporting whom and in what amounts,
in order to deter contribution-derived, post-election policy favors or appointments to office. 12 3 Surely to a democracy, resting ultimately on
informed voter choice, these are perhaps the weightiest governmental
124
interests imaginable. And so the courts have held them.

Disclosure itself thus serves first amendment values, a factor
which mitigates to a considerable degree whatever first amendment interests are infringed by a possible "chill" on, or reprisal for, contributing. But what about the means chosen? It is true that the 1974
Amendments cure some of the principal defects of the 1971 Act's dis-

closure provisions which had raised doubts about their constitutionality.'

Specifically, the establishment of what is likely to be an effec-

tive enforcement mechanism in the Federal Election Commission,1 26
with the responsibility not only for receiving financial reports but also
for disseminating the information in them to the public, substantially

increases the effectiveness of the disclosure mechanism in attaining the
legitimate governmental interest which justifies it. The disclosure pro-

visions are further strengthened by the new prohibition against undisclosed earmarking, 2 7 a practice which permitted contributors to particular congressional candidates to avoid disclosure of their contribu2
tions and rendered the statutory scheme ineffective.
tection Against Governmental Intrusions in PoliticalAffairs, 47 MICH. L. REv. 181, 20406 (1948); Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions,51 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4243 (1966); Rosenthal, Campaign Financingand the Constitution, 9 HARv. J.LEois. 359,
403-10 (1972); Note, The Constitutionality of FinancialDisclosure Laws, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 345 (1974).
122. L. BRANDEIs, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).
123. See Freedom of Speech at 426-30.
124. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses the power [to pass appropriate legislation
to safeguard an election from the improper use of money to influence the result], as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments
and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction ...
Congress reached the conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to
prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.. . . [Tihe statute as a
whole is calculated to discourage the making and use of contributions for purposes of corruption. Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545,
548 (1934).
See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-626 (1954); United States v. Finance
Comm. to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1200-1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pichler
v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1068-1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill.
2d 570, 578, 289 N.E.2d 409, 413 (1972).
125. Freedom of Speech at 430-33.
126. 1974 Amendments § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437(c)).
127. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (6)).
128. See Polk, Congressional Campaign Contributions: Harder to Conceal, Nw R -
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But for United States v.Finance Committee to Re-elect the President" ' and Stoner v. Fortson,' one would be tempted to question the
validity of the continuing requirements of retention of records about
all contributions of $10 or more and public disclosure of all contributions in excess of $100, amounts which could hardly purchase special
policy favors or an appointment to office for a contributor. These provisions compel disclosure of the identity and political preferences of a
contributor who is particularly vulnerable to reprisal, the small political
giver who supports his chosen candidate not in pursuit of personal gain
but out of a shared political ideology or a shared view of the public
interest. While no court has yet found actual deterrence,13 1 surely the
last two years have given us ample evidence of political reprisals against
campaign contributors 132 to create a strong presumption against unduly
exposing to public view and potential pressure those whose contributions are not of sufficient magnitude to pose a danger to the integrity
of elections and public policymaking. With respect to contributions of
such size, the donors' right to political privacy 3' should outweigh the
governmental interest asserted in justification of disclosure. But what
is the threshold at which political influence potential begins? In view
of the detailed data now available as a result of the 1971 Campaign
Act, which revealed that ninety-six percent of all political contributions
in 1972 were of $100 or less, and that Nixon received 900,000 and
McGovern 700,000 of such contributions, 3 4 one must now concede
that a congressional selection of the $100 discosure threshold deserves respect.'"8 But if the disclosure provision is flawed, it is only
in detail and not in principle, and could be cured by lifting the disclosure threshold to a higher figure, perhaps $250, or a figure set at
different levels in House, Senate, and presidential races.
Apr. 22, 1972, at 16; Comment, A Constitutional Remedy for the High Cost
of Broadcast and Newspaper Advertising in Political Campaigns, 60 CALiF. L. REv.
1371, 1387 n.120 (1972); 30 CoNG. Q. 713 (1972); Comment, The Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971: Reform of the PoliticalProcess?, 60 GEo. L.J. 1309, 1324 n.72
(1972). But see Statutory Comment, Undisclosed Earmarking: Violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 10 Hmxv. I. Luois. 175 (1973).
129. 507 F.2d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
130. 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
131, See United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194,
1199 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
132. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 1, cols. 5, 6.
133. See Freedom of Speech at 410-33.
134, United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1200
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
135. Id.
PUBLIC,
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QuantitativeLimitations on Contributions
Unlike compelled disclosure, contribution limitations in fact coerce particular behavior; they prevent an individual or group from contributing more than a statutorily permissible sum. If the behavior involved is constitutionally protected, its infringement would therefore
require a weightier governmental interest in order to be sustained against
attack.
We shall assume that contributing the funds which enable the candidates to speak out is equivalent to speaking out oneself. While
there are no Court holdings directly on point,136 common sense suggests that speech is effectively heard in our society only if it is cast
broadly about, which requires the buying of space or time. It is sophistry to argue that limiting the money one can spend on political speech
is not the same thing as limiting the "amount" of one's political
speech,137 which would be unconstitutional if the first amendment
were read literally. But the first amendment has never been literally
interpreted, and discovering a protected right upon which contribution
limitations infringe is not dispositive of the matter.
While Professor Winter has persuasively argued that "[elven under
a 'balancing' test, such regulation [contribution and expenditure limitations] is invalid because there is no countervailing interest (for exexample, preserving public peace) to 'balance' against the restriction
on speech,"' 38 there do seem to be several legitimate governmental objectives which may be asserted as countervailing interests in justification of what is an obvious limitation on speech. Surely if one limits
the size of individual contributions, one diminishes the likelihood that
contributions will be large enough to warrant being rewarded by postelection policy favors or appointments. We have witnessed enough incidents of such legal bribery' 39 to know that the danger involved, far
136. See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in United States v. International Union of Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 594 (1957).
137. See, e.g., Professor Freund's contention on this point:
The right to speak is ... more central to the values envisaged by the First
Amendment than the right to spend. We are dealing here not so much with
the right of personal expression or even association, but with dollars and decibels. And just as the volume of sound may be limited by law, so the volume
of dollars may be limited without violating the First Amendment. Freund,
Commentary, in A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 110, at 72.
138. See Winter, Money, Politics and the First Amendment, in H. PENNIMAN & R.
WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCEs:

Two

VIEws OF THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IM-

PLICATIONS 45, 60 (American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971).
139. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 12, col. 2 (truckers' bill included campaign contributions); id., Sept. 22, 1974, § 4, at 2, col. 3 (summary of special interest groups'
contributions); id., Sept. 16, 1974, at 19, col. 1 (maritime unions contribute $333,000);
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from being conjectural and overstated, 140 presents itself with sufficient
frequency to warrant direct remedy. If significant influence over
policy or appointments can be acquired by means of legal campaign
contributions, the equal protection guarantees are violated and public
confidence in government is weakened. The author of a recent comment put it well:
To the extent that special attention is demanded by and given to the
contributors of large sums of money to political campaigns, . . . representative democracy . . . is undermined. With it is undermined the

confidence of citizens in the fairness and representative character of
their government. . . . To that extent, regulation of campaign contributions with the aim of limiting the special influence of major contributors is a legitimate and necessary policy in a truly democratic system.141
It is argued, however, that the large contributors who seek no favors far outnumber those who expect a reward. 142 Assuming that to
be correct, and conceding also that those individuals and groups seeking no personal favors have a constitutionally protected right to use
their own funds in order to advance their general policy preferences
by supporting candidates who share them,143 it does not necessarily follow that there should be no limit on the size of such contributions. For
there is another objective besides eliminating contribution-derived
policy influence, that of diminishing wealth-based differential influence
in the political process. It is this objective which all of the contribution limitations-those on the candidate and his family, the individual
with respect to particular races, the individual with respect to his aggregate giving, and the political committee with respect to particular
races' 44 -aim at attaining. Is it a valid objective of sufficient importance to outweigh the conceded infringement of political speech? A
growing body of cases and scholarship suggests that it is. 14 5
id,, June 1, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (Watergate Committee links milk price support increases
with contribution to Nixon); id., Oct. 13, 1973, at 14, col. 7 (Howard Hughes's contributions seen as influencing SEC investigation of his business finances); Anderson, The
Senators' Oil Money, Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1974, § B, at 7, col. 4; Washington Post,
Sept. 15, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 4 ($600,000 in AMA gifts to Congressmen).
140. See R. Wn Rnt, WATERGATE AND Tu, LAw 8 (American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1974).
141. Comment, The Constitutionality of Restrictions on Individual Contributions to
Candidatesin FederalElections, supra note 110 at 1612.
142. R. WmTm, supra note 140 at 8.
143. Id. at 19.
144. See notes 136-171 supra and accompanying text.
145. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972); Harper v. Virginia Ed. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See also I. RAwIs,
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It is indisputable that contributors of large campaign gifts, irrespective of any considerations of motive, have an impact on election
campaigns far in excess of the impact which smaller contributors or
noncontributors have. Simply because they have more discretionary
capital available, they are able to help their preferred candidates and
positions much more than other citizens who may feel just as intensely
but who are without the resources necessary to translate their views
into campaign effectiveness. This impact, which David Adamany has
called multiple voting,1 46 means that such donors affect the political
process much more extensively than a one-man-one-vote principle
would suggest as desirable.
In addition to this impact, large donors acquire by virtue of their
contribution some amount of influence over the candidates they support.147 Whether that influence is actually used at all by a particular
contributor, if only in gaining access to an office-holder, or for a public
end rather than a private interest, it is nonetheless influence which
other citizens, who do not possess funds in sufficient quantity to give,
do not have, and never can acquire. How different, in reality, is this
influence from that which Chief Justice Burger condemned in Bullock v. Carter,1 48 when striking down large Texas filing fees for nominations?
Many potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent backers are in every practical sense precluded from seeking the
nomination of their chosen party, no matter how qualified they might
be and no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support. The
effect of this exclusionary mechanism on voters is neither incidental nor
remote. Not only are voters substantially limited in their choice of
candidates, but also there is the obvious likelihood that this limitation
would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community,
whose favorites may be unable to pay the large costs required by the
Texas system. To the extent that the system requires candidates to rely
on contributions from voters in order to pay the assessments, a phenomenon that can hardly be rare in light of the size of the fees, it tends to
deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing; at the same time it gives the affluent the power to place on the
ballot their own names or the names of persons they favor.. . . This
disparity in voting power based on wealth cannot be described by reference to discrete and precisely defined segments of the community as is
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225-26 (1971); Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 815 (1974).

146. D. ADAMANY, FINANCING PoLmcs 236 (1969).
147. See id. at 213; H. AI.ExANDER, supranote 1, at 147.
148. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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typical of inequities challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, and
there are doubtless some instances of candidates representing the views
of voters of modest means who are able to pay the required fee. But
we would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls
on voters, as well as candidates, according to their
with unequal weight
149
economic status.
It is true that in the filing fee cases such as Bullock there was

a positive state action which was held to burden access to the ballot,
while here the reverse is true: the contribution limitations constitute

an attempt by Congress to protect and advance, through legislation, the
same interests which the Court sought to protect in its Bullock and
Lubin decisions. While the Court would not have been likely to strike
down campaign finance laws which permitted contributions of unlimited size to finance federal elections, 150 surely it should give great
weight to a congressional enactment, expressed in reasonable ceilings
on contributions, which aims at limiting the extent to which wealthderived political impact and influence operate within the political process." 5 And suppose there were a congressional determination that the
constitutional values of equal protection can be attained in the political
process only by imposing ceilings on the size of private contributions.
As Professor Nicholson has suggested,15 2 such a determination should
be most useful as part of the compelling governmental interest which
must be adduced in order to justify the infringement of first amendment rights. What could be more compelling than another explicit
constitutional value, particularly one as fundamental to democracy as
53
equal protection of the laws?
Here, too, as in the case of disclosure, there are problems with
149. Id. at 143-44. The Supreme Court underscored its holding in Bullock by invalidating a small California filing fee in Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), saying
that "the process of qualifying candidates for a place on the ballot may not constitutionally be measured solely in dollars." Id. at 716.
150. See Public Financingat 365-69.
151. This is not to argue, of course, that congressional power to implement fifth
amendment equal protection is as broad as Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966),
held its power to implement fourteenth amendment equal protection to be. See Cox,
Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv.
L. Rnv. 91, 107 (1966); Nicholson, supra note 145, at 836-42. Unlike the situation
in Morgan, however, Congress clearly has power to regulate both presidential and congressional elections. See Public Financingat 369-72; Rosenthal, supra note 121, at 36272, 386-87. The issue here is the extent to which Congress, in implementing its avowed
authority to regulate elections, can seek to serve equal protection values embodied in the
Constitution, even if first amendment rights are thereby infringed.
152. Nicholson, supra note 145, at 816, 822.
153. See Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. C.
L. REV. 199, 224-47 (1971).
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the congressional means employed. One is cured by another provision of the 1974 Amendments and the other easily curable by further
legislation. The first, and most serious, fault is the extent to which
the new contribution limitations increase the difficulty for an unknown
or sparsely known candidate in getting his campaign primed. It has
been suggested that Senator George McGovern probably could not
have launched his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972 without large "seed" money contributions. 5 4 Even Governor George Wallace, with widespread public name recognition and
extensive support, required sufficient front-money from large contributions to finance the campaign to solicit small contributions. 15 5 With
our growing reliance on primaries to select nominees, the loss of large
contributions, without substituting other sources for them, could be
devastating to potential presidential candidates.' 56
There is now, however, a substitute source for such funds. Another provision of the 1974 Amendments-that which establishes partial public financing of presidential primaries' 57-considerably
mitigates the candidate deterrence effect of contribution limitations.
While funds available through the Presidential Primary Matching Fund
Account will not entirely take up the slack caused by banning contribution of more than $1000 by individuals and $5000 by political committees, the Matching Fund, assuming it or something like it is sustained
against constitutional attack, will add one additional public dollar to
every dollar raised privately up to a maximum of $250 per contributor and an aggregate of $5 million per candidate. Moreover, and perhaps of even greater importance than the actual dollars, is the fact that
the qualification-determining mechanism for the funds-raising a minimum of $5000 in each of twenty states-itself constitutes an acceptable
test for determining the seriousness of a presidential candidacy.'" 5
Assuming its constitutional flaws' 59 are remedied, such a test is greatly
154. See Brief for Plaintiff at 17, 30-31, Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-1061 (D.C.
Cir., filed June 2, 1975). But see Brief of Intervening Defendants on Certified Constitutional Questions at 106-08, Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-1061 (D.C. Cir., filed June

2, 1975).
155. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
156. Any contribution limitation deterrence to Congressional candidates is not likely
to be serious because contributions to Senatorial and House campaigns of more than
$1,000 are extremely rare. See Common Cause, Summary of Key Findings by the Com-

mon Cause Campaign Finance Monitoring Project for 1972 and 1974 Federal Elections
(mimeo, Apr. 24, 1975).
157. 1974 Amendments § 408(a) (codified at INT. REv. CoDE op 1954, §§ 9031 et
seq).
158. See text preceding note 212 infra.

159. See notes 212-29 infra and accompanying text.
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preferable to raising large sums of money from small numbers of contributors, because it spreads the gatekeeping function for presidential
races among at least 400 people in twenty states, and probably many
times that number in fact. No one who could have launched a presidential campaign under the system of unlimited contributions is likely
to be deterred from doing so by the combination of contribution limitations with dollar for dollar matching, and some who could not have
mustered the funds heretofore will now be able to run. 1 0 While subsidization of presidential primary campaigns may result in an increase
in the number of candidates, such an increase is likely to be far less
extensive than the increase attributable to widespread selection of
presidential convention delegates by primaries. 16 ' Instead of increasing the number, it would seem that public subsidization is more likely
to change slightly the kind of people who succeed in launching campaigns, giving regional and philosophically noncentrist candidates a
greater opportunity to compete for the presidency. Whatever the
policy wisdom of such an outcome, ' the principle cannot be faulted
constitutionally.
The second flaw in the means chosen is more troubling. It would
appear from the law as it currently stands that there is no limitation
on the size of contributions to political parties. If that is in fact the
case, such a loophole would entirely vitiate the effectiveness of the
limitations on contributions to candidates in achieving the objectives set
out above. Those seeking to obtain favors could simply make their
unlimited contributions to the parties for use in the general elections,
party administration, or candidate-oriented general party publicity, and
be rewarded accordingly after the election. If this loophole exists, it
would enable special interests to have far greater influence on policy
decisions by spending much less money than heretofore, because the
parties need so much less than candidates.
The doubt as to the existence of such a loophole is created by
the statutory definition of a contribution:
160. For the argument that the high cost of soliciting substantial amounts in small
contributions-and thus of obtaining matching funds-cannot be met without large gifts
to finance early fund-raising efforts, see Brief for Plaintiff at 17, 30-31, Buckley v.
Valeo, Civil No. 75-1061 (D.C. Cir. filed June 2, 1975).
161. Presidential and vice-presidential candidates are selected at national nominating conventions consisting of delegations from each state. In eighteen
states and the District of Columbia, primary elections are mandated for the
selection of delegates to national conventions. Twenty states provide parties
with the option of choosing either a primary or a convention to select delegates. Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 1153-54 (1975).
162. It can hardly be doubted that such fractionalization would tend to further
weaken the capacity of established parties to field presidential candidates. See N.
PoLsBY & A. WILDAvsKY, PRnsmEmuL ELECTIONS - (4th ed. 1975).
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"(e) contribution"
(1) means a gift .

.

. made for the purpose of influencing the

nomination for election, or election, of any person to Federal office or
for the purpose of influencing the results of a primary held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political
party or for the expression of a preference for the nomination
of persons
163
for election to the office of President of the United States.
In this definition of contribution, which governs the meaning of contribution throughout the campaign finance statutes, the emphasis is on
electing a particular candidate to a particular office. Indeed the contribution limitation provisions speak even more precisely when they enjoin that "no person shall make contributions to any candidate"'1 4 and
"no political committee shall make contributions to any candidate ' 16 5
in excess of $1000 and $5000, respectively. If these limitations apply
only to contributions to any candidate, what limitations apply to contributions to political parties? A careful examination of the law reveals
none.
Yet it is clear that the statute envisions that the parties will spend
money in behalf of particular candidates, because it places explicit ceilings on the amounts party committees can spend in behalf of party candidates for President,16 the Senate, 6 ' and the House. 6 8 Those funds
have to come from somewhere.
It might be argued that a contribution to a party is a contribution
as defined above, on the theory that most funds collected by national,
state, and district party committees are ultimately for the purpose of
electing party candidates to office, many of which are federal. That
is a tortured construction of the statute, however, and it leads moreover
to a further dilemma-what the actual ceiling on a contribution to a
party would be. The dollar limitations in the statute clearly apply to
contributions directed to particular candidates. If applied also to contributions to parties, the limits presumably would permit political party
donations to be used for the unrestricted and undivided benefit of all
candidates the party supports-in the amount of $1000 in the case
of individual contributors and $5000 in the case of committee contributors times the total number of candidates supported by the recipient
party committee. That would clearly be an absurd result. The only
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

1974 Amendments § 102(c) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 591(e)).
Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1)).
Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2)).
Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f) (2)).
Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f)(3)(A)).
Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f)(3)(B)).
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conclusion to be reached, then, is that the contribution ceilings do not
apply to contributions to political parties.
Nor, it appears, do they apply to contributions to political associations-such as the National Committee for an Effective Congress or
the business and labor political committees which contribute to many
different candidates-unless the contribution is expressly earmarked
for a particular candidate. 169 This means, in effect, that there is no
ceiling on individual contributions to any political committee supporting
70
more than four candidatesY.
The consequences of this loophole are
not nearly so troubling as the omission of a ceiling on contributions to
a party, because, unlike political parties, these committees are not
likely to be directly involved in state and national policymaking, and
will therefore not be in a position to obtain favors for the unlimited
contributors. To the extent, however, that wealthy contributors can
continue to make unlimited contributions to political committees,
which, in turn, can contribute a maximum of $5000 to any federal candidate, the statutory means of diminishing wealth-derived political influence and impact is flawed.
Both of these flaws can be easily cured by an amendment which,
at the least, places the same $1000 and $5000 ceilings on contributions
to parties and political committees as currently apply to contributions
to candidates. If limitations on contributions to candidates are constitutional in principle, as they appear to be, such extensions of the limitations would seem equally valid. Unless the party contribution loophole is plugged, the new contribution limitations should be invalidated
for ineffectiveness in attaining their legitimate governmental objective.
A final problem arises out of the definition of a political committee, an entity on which the statute imposes a contribution ceiling of
$5000 to any one candidate for federal office. In order for this ceiling to apply, the committee must have been registered with the Federal
Election Commission for not less than six months, have received contributions from more than fifty people, and have made contributions to
five or more federal candidates. 7 The formation of a political committee only two or three months prior to an election would present a
perplexing question under the statutory definition. Would such a
group be exempted completely from the $5000 contribution ceiling, a
169. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (6)).
170. A "political committee" must have made contributions to five or more candidates in order to qualify for the $5000 ceiling. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(b) (2)).
171. Id.
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result which clearly would permit the frustration of the entire contribution limitation structure by late-forming groups? Or would the members of such a committee be barred entirely from making donations
through the group, an alternative which raises first amendment issues?
The statute itself sheds no light on the problem, but one must assume that the former alternative was surely not the intention of Congress. Since the latter seems the correct choice, the possibility of an
unconstitutional infringement of speech and association must be faced.
If the individual contribution limitation is sustained, it would appear
reasonable to argue that the Constitution requires no more than that
each individual be permitted to contribute, by himself, the ceiling
amount. The privilege of contributing through groups, then, would be
within the power of Congress to withhold or to grant, thus giving to
Congress the discretion to confine the availability of the political committee contribution to those groups operating for six months or more
prior to an election. Citizens wishing to form such a committee within
six months of election day could simply aggregate their individual contribution ceilings, candidate by candidate.
QuantitativeLimitations on Expenditures by Candidates
Like contribution ceilings, expenditure limitations inevitably restrain speech; they prevent a candidate from buying space or time, for
example, beyond the statutory ceiling. Unlike the flaw in the contribution limitations, however, the constitutional defect in expenditure
limitations is basic and appears to be irremediable.711
Because expenditure limitations are a restraint on speech, they
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest in order to
withstand first amendment attack. Some persuasive arguments have
been offered in behalf of the legitimacy and weight of the governmental interest which expenditure limitations are designed to serve, principally the objective of diminishing the deterrence of candidates from
running by bringing or holding down the cost of campaigns to what is
regarded as a more reasonable level.17 3 Most campaign finance
scholars would assert, however, that our campaigns are underfinanced
172. For a more extensive discussion of expenditure limitations, see Freedom of
Speech at 450-65. See also Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541 (Ore. 1975); Bare v. Gorton,

84 Wash. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 541 (1974) (recent cases invalidating state expenditure limitation laws).

173. See, e.g., D. ADnA Y,supra note 146, at 7-19, 108-71; A. HEARD, supra note
32, at 16-19; R. WImER, supra note 140, at 5-17; Fingerhut, A Limit on Campaign
Spending-Who Will Benefit?, 25 THE Put. ITERnsr 3 (1971); Freedom of Speech at
455-65.
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rather than too expensive, by reference both to what other nations
spend per voter and to what we spend for other kinds of advertising.17 4
Assuming the legitimacy of the objective, however, there are serious

constitutional barriers to attaining it and no feasible way of surmounting them.
The Problem of Incumbency Advantage
The idea behind expenditure limitations is to equalize what can-

didates for the same office may spend in campaigning. If incumbents
and challengers are both held to the same dollar limitations, however,
challengers will inevitably be disadvantaged by the incumbents'
pre-existing name recognition, campaign organization, media access,
and the publicly provided staff, services, and supplies available to all

office-holders. 7 5 Unless the value of such items can be figured into
the incumbents' campaign expenditure ceilings-and there appears to

be no conceivable means of doing so-challengers might be seriously
174. See D. ADAMANY, supra note 146, at 234-44; D. DUNN, FINANcINo PESIDMETIAL
CAMPAIGNS 32 (1969); R. WINTER, supranote 140, at 6-7.
175. In 1970 a member of the House of Representatives with fewer than a half
million constituents was entitled, simply by being a congressman, to the following:
About $125,000 per year for salaries for a staff of up to 12 employees (13
if his constituency was over the half million mark);
$5,500 worth of new or used office equipment;
$3,000 per year for stationery, supplies, and printing;
35,000 minutes of long-distance telephone time for a two-year term;
480,000 heavy-duty brown envelopes per year;
$700 worth of stamps per year;
$2,400 per year for the rental of office space in his district;
$2,400 per year for district office supplies, equipment, and telephone expense.
In addition, a congressman is entitled to free space in a House office building,
free and unlimited franked-first class postage, a publication allowance, the
services of radio-television studios for the production of tapes at a minimal
rate, and a travel allowance to cover one round trip home per month, and
three additional trips (one for himself and two for staff employees). He also
is able to mail various government documents to his district without charge.
The documents available for this purpose include the agriculture yearbook,
packets of 10 publications for brides, a booklet on infant care, documents for
visitors on Washington and the government, brochures, maps of the city, and
so on. Penniman, Financing Campaignsin the Public Interest, in H. PENNEmN
& R. WINTrm, supra note 138, at 17.
See Biden, Public Financing of Elections: Legislative Proposals and Constitutional
Questions, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 7-9, 63-65 (1974); Freedom of Speech at 468-71; Plattner, Campaign Financing: The Dilemmas of Reform, 37 TnE PUB. INTmmsr 118-22
(1974); Redish, supra note 110, at 915-20; Campaign Controls Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 8 COLum. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 285, 306-07 (1972); Note,
Congressional Prerequites and Fair Elections: The Case of the Franking Privilege, 83
YALE L.J. 1055 (1974).
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discriminated against by the expenditure limitations. Moreover, because high expenditures constitute the principal means of attack on incumbents by challengers, the lower the expenditure ceilings, the
greater the amount of discrimination. Even if Congress were willing
to enact differential expenditure ceilings which permitted challengers
to spend more than incumbents, how might one determine the appropriate increment for challengers' over incumbents' expenditures?
That hypothetical question aside, identical ceilings for incumbents
and challengers, such as are embodied in current law, would seem to
render the expenditure limitations unconstitutional for equal protection
reasons. Unfortunately, however, while the theoretical case for their
favoritism to incumbents is persuasive, empirical evidence of actual discrimination as a consequence of the current levels is nonexistent. The
Common Cause figures reveal that incumbents have generally been able
to raise as much as several times the amounts challengers have collected, 176 suggesting that expenditure limitations in fact can prevent incumbents from overwhelming challengers with money. 177 Moreover,
the principal study of 1972 senatorial campaign spending, 178 which
concluded that the present expenditure ceilings are significantly lower
than the amounts actually spent in 1972, apparently rests on incorrect
data analysis.' 7 9 In fact, in only a small percentage of recent elections
has either candidate spent more than the current limitations would per180

mit.

It is difficult, therefore, to conclude that expenditure limitations
at the level embodied in the 1974 Amendments are unconstitutional
in principle. Such a conclusion is not necessary, however, because of
other seemingly incurable problems.
Even if it were theoretically permissible to equalize expenditures
as between incumbents and challengers, it would be constitutionally impossible to do so in fact, for three different but related reasons.
176. Common Cause, supra note 156; see CONG. Q. 3130 (1973); Mintz, Incumbents
Outspent Challengers 2 to 1, Study Shows, Washington Post, Sept. 14, 1973, § A, at 2,
col. 1. Democratic Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin explained one apparent reason: "The point is that the incumbent gets the big contribution because the people who
are making contributions want to make them to the winners and not to the losers." 119
CoNo. ,Rc.26093 (1973).
177. D. Broder, Campaign Spending Law: Who Benefits?, Washington Post, June
11, 1975, § A, at 18, col. 5.
178. R. CorL, CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN SENATE ELECTIONS (1975).
179. See Brief of Intervening Defendants on Certified Constitutional Questions, app.
A, Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-1061 (D.C. Cir., filed June 2, 1975).
180. Id. at 132-34, 138-43.
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The Independent Actor
American politics is characterized by large numbers of individuals
who, on their own initiative and for their own reasons, wish to express
their views on political contests. Not only are such nationally known
individuals as Stewart Mott in this category, but so are thousands of
other citizens of both repute and disrepute at all levels of government.
They take out newspaper and television advertising on their own, and
sometimes publish signed leaflets. In effect, they are attempting to
communicate to their fellow citizens their own candidate preferences,
hoping to convince them.
It seems clear from the, cases that an absolute ban on such expression by individuals or groups, not under the control of or in collusion
with a candidate, would be unconstitutional.18 ' The 1974 Amendments do not totally ban such expression, but instead impose a $1000
ceiling on expenditures for such purposes."8 2 Assuming the soundness
of the rationale advanced above in support of limitations on the size
of contributions made to candidates,' s a similar ceiling on direct expenditures on behalf of candidates would seem equally valid. 84
Even if it is constitutionally permissible to put a ceiling on the
amount of expenditures by such independent political actors, and to require them to report their expenditures to the Federal Elections Commission, 8 5 however, there is no conceivable way of limiting the number
of citizens who choose to express their candidate preference by buying
their own newspaper, radio, and television advertisements. The 1974
Amendments do not even try to do that. If an unlimited number of
independent actors-groups as well as individuals-can take sides in
an election, it is impossible in fact to equalize expenditures. Since the
amounts of money legally spent by and in behalf of contestants in a
campaign, therefore, cannot be equalized constitutionally, expenditure
limitations on candidates must fall for failure to attain their objective.
181. Cf. Bickel, Commentary, in A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 110, at 66; Freund, Commentary, in A. RosENTHAL, supra note 110, at 75. See also R. Wi-TER, supra note 140,
at 25-28; Freedom of Speech at 472-75; Redish, supra note 110, at 900; Rosenthal, supra
note 121, at 390-93.
182. 1974 Amendments § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1)).
183. See text accompanying notes 138-53 supra.
184. I am indebted to Professor William Van Alstyne for pointing out that even if
contribution limitations were sustained on the theory that Congress may constitutionally
limit how one spends one's money, it would still be possible for the Court to strike down
the direct expenditure ceiling, because the latter is spent personally in directly expressing
political views.
185. 1974 Amendments § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437(a)).
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The Anti-Candidate Committee
The second flaw in a system of expenditure limitations arises from
the problem caused by an anti-candidate committee. This is a variant
of the independent actor problem, and the argument is similar.
How is it possible, within a framework of expenditure ceilings on
candidates, to take account of the expenditures of an anti-candidate
committee which is not under the control of the candidate being benefited by its activities? In a two-way race, it might appear at first glance
to make sense to charge the expenditures against the expenditure limitations of the benefited candidate, as the Comptroller General's regulations for the 1971 Campaign Act did. 8 6 Suppose, however, that the
benefited candidate genuinely disapproves of such activities, which by
the very nature of an anti-candidate committee tend to be negative,
and feels that they harm him as much as, or even more than, the candidate against whom the attacks are directed. There is no constitutional
way he or anyone else can prevent an anti-candidate committee from
attacking his opponent. Why is it justifiable, then, to diminish the
amount he is permitted to spend by the amount spent by the anti-candidate committee? In a three-, four-, or five-way race, even this unfair
solution would be unavailable because there are multiple beneficiaries
of the attacks.
The net result again is to render equalization of candidate expenditures impossible, and candidate expenditure limitations ineffective.
The Issue-OrientedCommittee
The third source of difficulty for expenditure limitations is the issue-oriented organization. From time to time, a candidate becomes
so clearly and publicly identified with a particular side of a controversial
issue that an issue organization can conduct a campaign for or against
him without ever mentioning his name.1 8 7 This is precisely what happened, for example, when the anti-gun control lobby defeated Senator
Joseph Tydings. 8 s
There would appear to be no constitutional way to prevent an organization or an individual from buying advertisements, even during
186. 37 Fed. Reg. 6158 (1972).

187. If a candidate's name or likeness is used, or the candidate's identity is apparent
by "unambiguous reference," see 1974 Amendments § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
608(e) (2)), the situation would be more appropriately treated as an "independent actor"

or anti-candidate committee.
188. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970, at 35, col. 1.
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a political campaign, which stress the need for citizen vigilance or action with respect to law and order, foreign entanglements, honesty in
government, or any other topic. Even where an issue organization
names a candidate, it would seem impossible to restrain its activity, or
to account for it within the framework of candidate expenditure equalization. Thus, for example, it was held to be impossible to require that
an organization promoting the impeachment of President Nixon, during
the course of the 1972 presidential campaign, register as a political
committee under the 1971 Campaign Act. 8 9 Similarly, another court
held that an American Civil Liberties Union advertisement, opposing
the Nixon Administration's anti-busing policy and listing the names of
102 members of Congress who opposed it, was not within the purview
of the registraton provisions of the 1971 Campaign Act.190 So long
as issue organizations are free to spend all they wish, and there is happily no constitutional way of restraining them, they constitute another
obstacle in the way of effecting equality of candidate expenditures.
Once again, therefore, the means is found defective in fact.
As a result of these three flaws, the candidate expenditure limitations enacted in the 1974 Amendments seem unconstitutional by virtue
of their ineffectiveness in attaining their objective of equalizing candidate expenditures. Moreover, remembering that the underlying reasons for candidate expenditure limitations are to diminish both deterrence of candidates from running for office and differential advantage accruing from differential access to contributors, there is a much
less drastic means to the same end embodied in the 1974 Amendments
-the combination of public subsidization, at least with respect to presidential elections, and contribution limitations. As has been suggested
earlier, neither of these provisions is faulty in principle, and both are
directed, in part, at attaining the same objectives as expenditure limitations. As a consequence, we must conclude that there appears to be
no feasible means of saving the candidate expenditure limitation from
invalidation.Y9'
189. United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir.
1972).
190. ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), prob. juris. noted sub
nor. Staats v. ACLU, 417 U.S. 944, stay of district court order granted pending final
disposition, 418 U.S. 910 (1974).
191. Public subsidization of political campaigns, parties, and conventions out of general revenues would, of course, also raise serious first amendment questions. See R.
VINTER, supra note 140, at 29-34; Public Financing at 406-16; 78 HARv. L. Rv. 1260
(1965). However, since all subsidies provided by the 1974 Amendments come from
taxpayer-checked-off funds-with the explicit understanding of all taxpayers that the
funds are to be divided among all recipients according to statutory formulas-the subsi-
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EQUAL PROTECTION INFIRMITIES IN THE
1974 AMENDMENTS

The Frameworkfor Examining Equal ProtectionClaims

There is no doubt that the fifth amendment's due process clause 92
constrains federal action within equal protection norms, just as the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause193 constrains state action.194 While the language in the cases suggests that the scope of pro-

tection by the two amendments may not be identical,195 no case has
been found which differentiates in its protection on the basis of the

fact that it is the federal government rather than a state that is the actor
involved. 19 6 The conclusion must be, therefore, as the Court observed
in the leading case of Bolling v. Sharpe, that "it would be unthinkable

that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
197
Governmenf' than on the states.

The appropriate standard of review of equal protection claims asserted against election reform measures is somewhat less clear. We
know that the Court uses two different degrees of intensity in examining for equal protection flaws-what it has in times past called the
"strict scrutiny" test and the "rational relation" test-and that the constitutionality of any government action may well turn on the choice
of test by which it is measured. 198

The lighter, highly restrained re-

view tests only for reasonableness in the challenged action: Does the
action serve a legitimate public purpose and are the means chosen rea-

sonably calculated to attain the ends? The stringent, meticulous exdies would seem to be clearly invulnerable to a first amendment challenge. For a discussion of equal protection issues surrounding such public subsidies, see notes 138-84
infra and accompanying text.
192. "No person shall be.. .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .

."

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

193. "No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
194. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168 (1964); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372
U.S. 714, 721 (1963) (dictum); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
195. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
196. See Hughes, Constitutional Limitations on Territorial Differences in Federal
Food Assistance, 4 SuFF. U.L. Rnv. 742, 750 (1970).
197. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
198. The Court has been less than consistent in describing the test it was applying
in any given case. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972);
Public Financingat 384-88. Sometimes the Court doesn't even advert to the fact that
it has made a choice of tests, but proceeds directly to examining the substantive issues
involved. For a good example of the latter, see Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974),
which is discussed at notes 142-50 infra and accompanying text.
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amination adds a criterion of necessity to the test for reasonableness:
Are the ends legitimate, and the means both reasonable and necessary?' Which of these tests the Court employs in any given case
is determined by the nature of the rights allegedly infringed upon or
the character of the decision criteria employed in the governmental action complained against. If what the Court calls "fundamental interests"-such as "the right to vote" 20 -are at stake, or what it denominates "suspect classifications"-such as race20 1-are used, the stringent
test applies. In all other situations, only the reasonableness criterion is
used.
Were only such comparatively simple categories as "fundamental
interests" and "suspect classifications" at issue, 202 it would be clear that
stringent scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for the equal
protection questions raised by the 1974 Amendments. All of the problems involve impacts on candidacy for public office, and, while candidacy itself has been held not to be in principle a fundamental interest, 0
the right to vote, which is a fundamental interest, is regarded as infringed where restrictions on candidacy significantly limit voter
choice.20 4 Moreover, those provisions which utilize a monetary criterion of eligibility or benefit entitlement inherently employ a classification based on wealth, which, at least in the context of elections, has
been designated a suspect classification. 205
Our problem is more complicated, however, because of the exemption from strict scrutiny given by Katzenbach v. Morgan20 6 to statutes which are directed towards increasing equal protection:
In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny
of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights

. . .

is inapplicable;

199. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972). In determining whether the means
chosen are in fact necessary, the Court wisely employs a "least onerous alternative" test
very similar to that used in first amendment analysis. Cf. note 117 supra and accompanying text.
200. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For a recent
discussion of "fundamental interests," see Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
201. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
202. For a summary listing of "fundamental interests" and "suspect classifications,"
see Public Financingat 385-86.
203. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). See Developments in the Law:
Elections, supra note 110, at 1135 n.81, 1176.
204. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968).
205. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
206. 384U.S. 641 (1966).'
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for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to
207
the exercise of the franchise.

Since the 1974 Amendments were clearly intended to reform political
campaign financing, this ameliorative statute exception might be
thought to justify a review only for reasonableness. There is an important
difference, however, between the kind of reform involved in Katzenbach-the removal of barriers to voting-and the kind of reform em-

bodied in the 1974 Amendments. Because the latter extensively regulate the financing of election campaigns--determining, for example,

how much a donor may contribute and a candidate may spend, as well
as the amount of public funds to be given to candidates and partiesand because a sizable proportion of those who are regulated by the
legislation are the same as those who wrote the legislation, the Katzen-

bach reform exception to meticulous scrutiny should not apply. Instead the Court, prompted by the question "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?,"20° should be moved by the patent congressional self-interest involved to examine the Amendments with the greatest care. But for
the Katzenbach exception, strict scrutiny would clearly apply. Obvi-

ous potential self-interest should suffice to negate that exception in this
case. If it is insufficient, however, the number of points at which actual discrimination favorable to incumbents and major parties has been

alleged

09 should

constitute adequate warrant for strict scrutiny.

The Subsidy in PresidentialPrimaryElections
If we assume that the subsidization of political campaigns is a legitimate and proper governmental purpose,2 10 we can proceed to con207. Id. at 657.
208. "Who shall guard the guards?"
209. See Brief for Plaintiff at 149-63, 175-83, 204-17, Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No.
75-1061 (D.C. Cir., filed June 2, 1975).
210. For a decision to the contrary, see Opinion of the Justices, 347 Mass. 797, 197
N.E.2d 691 (1964); 78 HARv.L. Rav. 1260 (1965). That decision, which was rendered
long before public financing of elections was seriously contemplated, was heavily influenced by the partisan nature of the proposed legislation on which the Massachusetts Supreme Court had been requested by the Massachusetts House of Representatives to give
an advisory opinion. The legislation there being considered would have appropriated
funds to the two principal parties according to a formula based on each party's proportion of the votes cast in the preceding state primary, with the funds to be used by the
parties on behalf of party candidates in the succeeding general election. Such an obviously discriminatory distribution formula could not be constitutionally sustained since it
would favor a party with extensive primary competition over one without such fights.
The Massachusetts court did not even mention that issue, but instead seems to rest on
a principle of Massachusetts constitutional law that a purpose is public only if the
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front the three principal issues raised by the presidential primary election subsidy: 211 Is it constitutionally permissible to utilize an exclusively monetary criterion for determining eligibility for the subsidy
benefits, or a requirement that the funds raised for that purpose come
from at least twenty states, or an exclusively monetary criterion for determining the amount of subsidy funds to be distributed to those candidates who qualify for the subsidy?
Money as an Eligibility Determining Criterion. The rationale for
using a prospective candidate's capacity to raise money privately as the
means of qualifying for the presidential primary campaign subsidy is
attractive on first examination. Like all of the alternative qualifying
devices, its basic purpose is to establish the bona fides of a particular
candidacy-the seriousness and extent of the support which the candidate has. Surely the willingness of supporters to donate funds is a
better test of their commitment to a candidate than their willingness
to sign a petition in the candidate's behalf. Moreover, the satisfaction
of the qualifying test-the raising of $100,000 in contributions of $250
or less-is a more easily ascertainable and verifiable fact than the collection of a suitable number-probably a fairly large number-of
voters' signatures, each of which would have to be checked for residency, registration and any other conditions which might be attached.
Varying state registration practices would complicate the verification
process, making the petition signature alternative much more susceptible to fraud and manipulation.
Despite its simplicity and reliability, however, a monetary eligibility criterion has a serious constitutional flaw. Instead of manifesting
general public support for a contender, it reflects a candidate's support
among those who can afford to spend discretionary income or capital
on politics-a sizable, but nonetheless minority, proportion of the
agency or officers through whom it is served are a public body or public officers. As
political parties had been held not to be public bodies and their officers not public officers, the court's conclusions followed. There is no similar "public purpose" restraint in
the Constitution of the United States, and the "white primary" cases, such as Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), suggest no
analogous principle of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the manifold direct subsidies to airlines, shipping companies, farmers, and railroads, among others, and indirect
tax subsidies to nearly every kind of corporate enterprise provide a more than ample
precedent for public subsidization of political campaigns for federal office. The only
pertinent questions would seem to be two: What is the scope of Congressional power
to regulate elections? What constitutional safeguards constrain the manner in which
Congress exercises that power? This Article deals principally with the second question.
For answers to the first, see Rosenthal, supra note 121, at 362-72; Public Financing at
369-82.
211. 1974 Amendments § 408 (codified at INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 9031-42).
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population. In view of the Court's holdings and language in the filing
fee cases-Bullock v. Carter212 and Lubin v. Panish214--it is difficult
to see how an exclusively monetary eligibility criterion could be sustained against an equal protection attack. In Bullock, the Court invalidated a Texas primary election filing fee system in which the
charges could run as high as $8,900.214 In Lubin, the fee was only
slightly more than $700, but the Court nonetheless held it unconstitutional.215 In both cases, the Court stressed the prospective candidates'
inability to pay the filing fees, implying that mere unwillingness unaccompanied by inability would be insufficient to warrant a declaration
of unconstitutionality. 216 The problem, therefore, is not the existence
of the money eligibility criterion, but the fact that it is the exclusive
mode of qualifying. For those candidates with supporters who can afford to contribute, Court decisions suggest, it is a constitutionally acceptable means of determining seriousness. For candidates whose
supporters are without the requisite funds, however, it is an insuperable
barrier to actual candidacy and a denial of equal protection. It would
seem impossible to distinguish persuasively between paying filing fees
to qualify for a ballot position and raising private funds in order to
qualify for a public campaign subsidy. The purpose of the monetary
qualifying criterion is to assure that only serious candidates-those who
have a genuine chance to win-will be subsidized with public funds.
The purpose of filing fees, as the Supreme Court has noted, 17 is analogous-to assure that only serious candidates will have their names
printed on the ballot. The effects of both are similar, too. Persons
who cannot afford to pay filing fees are excluded from the ballot, while
persons who cannot raise the requisite amount of private campaign contributions are denied public subsidy for their campaigns, preventing
them either from running entirely or from campaigning effectively.
To be scrupulous, it should be noted that this point can be argued
another way. Denial of access to the printed ballot is an ultimate sanction; it effectively prevents a candidacy, even if a write-in campaign
is possible, rather than merely disadvantaging it. In that sense, on an
212. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).

213. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
214. 405 U.S.
215. 415 U.S.
216. 405 U.S.
(5th Cir. 1975),

at 145, 149.
at 710, 718.
at 146; 415 U.S. at 716-18. See also Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700
in which candidates who paid filing fees were denied reimbursement

on the theory that filing fees are unconstitutional only as applied to those who cannot
afford to pay them.

217. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
145-46 (1972).
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absolute scale, it is a more severe deprivation than denial of public subsidy.
Denial of campaign subsidy, however, while not as severe a sanction as denial of access to the printed ballot, is likely to be just as effective in destroying incipient candidacies. 2 18 With public "seed money,"
candidates who might never have been able to raise the funds necessary to run a campaign may gain sufficient attention to attract the
necessary contributions. Denied such money, they are consigned to
oblivion.
It might be argued that, because filing fees are usually paid by
candidates while the qualifying sum required by the subsidy plan is provided by a candidate's supporters, the analogy between the two is defective. Such a line of attack misses the point, however, because it
was the interests of the voters who might choose to vote for the excluded candidate-and not the interests of the candidate himselfwhich the Court was explicit in protecting in Bullock. In language that
seems tailor-made for the subsidy-qualifying issue, the Court remarked
as follows:
Many potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent
backers are in every practical sense precluded from seeking the nomination of their chosen party, no matter how qualified they might be,
and no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support. The
effect of this exclusionary mechanism on voters is neither incidental nor
remote. Not only are voters substantially limited in their choice of candidates, but also there is the obvious likelihood that this limitation would
fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community, whose
favorites may be unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas
system. To the extent that the system requires candidates to rely on
contributions from voters in order to pay the assessments, a phenomenon
that can hardly be rare in light of the size of the fees, it tends to deny
some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing;
at the same time it gives the affluent the power to place on the ballot
their own names or the names of persons they favor. Appellants do not
dispute that this is endemic to the system. This disparity in voting
power based on wealth cannot be described by reference to discrete and
precisely defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, and there are doubtless
some instances of candidates representing the views of voters of modest
means who are able to pay the required fee. But we would ignore
218. In this regard, it is interesting to note the extent to which the news media have
seized upon the failure of candidates to qualify for the presidential primary subsidy as
a principal indicator of a candidate's lack of promise.
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reality were we not to recognize that this sytem falls with unequal weight
219
on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic status.
The Court's heavy reliance on the interests of a candidate's prospective supporters and on their socio-economic background is even
more appropriate with respect to the subsidy-qualifying mechanism than
it is to filing fees. To qualify for the subsidy, a candidate must raise
the necessary funds from his supporters. If his supporters are without
means sufficient to contribute, it is their indigency which is being discriminated against in the political arena, not his.
Perhaps the most persuasive factor is that public subsidy of election campaigns, very unlike the passive character of regulation of
printed ballot access, is an enormous governmental intervention into
the political process. When the government chooses to act so influentially, decisively, and in so active a character, it cannot do so in discriminatory ways.
For this reason, what is involved in denying or granting a subsidy
has consequences on voters which are at least as grave as the results
of denying or granting ballot access. It is difficult to imagine, therefore, that the Court would choose to rest its decision on an extremely
narrow and formalistic distinction between ballot access and public subsidy of campaigns.
Assuming that to be correct, what the Court said in Lubin about
filing fees would seem just as applicable to an exclusively monetary
subsidy eligibility criterion:
The absence of any alternative means of gaining access to the ballot inevitably renders the California system exclusionary as to some aspirants. As we have noted, the payment of a fee is an absolute, not an
alternative, condition, and failure to meet it is a disqualification from
running for office. Thus, California has chosen to achieve the important and legitimate interest of maintaining the integrity of elections
by means which can operate to exclude some potentially serious candidates from the ballot without providing them with any alternative means
of coming before the voters. Selection of candidates solely on the basis
of ability to pay a fixed fee without providing any alternative means is
not reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate
election interests. Accordingly, we hold that in the absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not, consistent with
constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate filing fees
2 20
he cannot pay.
219. 405 U.S. at 143-44.
220. 415 U.S. at 718.
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The Court's prescription for remedying the constitutional flaw in
filing fees-the use of a reasonable petition signature alternative2 2 1 seems equally applicable to public campaign subsidy. Assuming a petition percentage requirement that is high enough to discourage frivolous candidates but sufficiently low to avoid unduly burdening serious
contenders,2 22 petition signatures would seem to constitute the most
likely cure for the most serious fault in the subsidy qualifying mechanism. In the absence of such an alternative mode of qualifying, the
presidential primary election subsidy must be regarded as unconstitutional.
Geographical Distribution as a Requisite of Eligibility. After
Baker v. Carr, 223 Gray v. Sanders, 24 and Reynolds v. Sims, 225 any political representation mechanism which rests on geographical areas rather than on population should occasion the raising of eyebrows. To
qualify for the presidential primary election subsidy, a candidate must
raise a minimum of $5000 from each of twenty states in contributions
of no more than $250.226 Such a requirement obviously warrants some
examination.
The only case in point is Moore v. Ogilvie,227 which invalidated
an Illinois statute requiring that petition signatures for ballot access be
geographically distributed among at least fifty counties of the state,
with no fewer than 200 signatures per county. The flaw there, as the
Court was quick to point out, lay in the obvious attempt by the Illinois
Legislature to burden candidates from metropolitan Chicago, which
contains in fewer than ten counties somewhat more than half the population of the state, with the onus of gathering signatures in counties
with a tiny fraction of the state's population.
One cannot jump from Moore, however, to the conclusion that the
presidential primary twenty-state requirement is unconstitutional. What
is true within a single state-that every citizen's vote counts
equally with every other citizen's vote--is not true in presidential elections. As a consequence of the structure of the electoral college, the
votes of citizens in some states weigh more heavily than those of citi221. Id. at 718-19.
222. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968). See also American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Public Financing at 391-95.
223. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
224. 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (requiring that congressional districts be approximately
equal in population).
225. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring that both houses of a state legislature be constituted on the basis of population).
226. 1974 Amendments § 408 (codified at INT. REv. COM OF 1954, § 9033(b)).
227. 394 U.S. 814 (1969), overruling MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
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zens in other states. 228 Because the geographical representation inherently embodied in the electoral college has constitutional sanction,
it is highly improbable that a geographical distribution requisite for
qualifying for the public subsidy in primary campaigns for the presidency would be held unconstitutional. Not only is there such formal
constitutional sanction; added to it also is the logic of the structure imposed on presidential elections by the electoral college.

If, to win the

presidential election, a candidate must capture the electoral college
vote blocs of entire states on a winner-take-all basis, it is not an irrational test of candidacy seriousness to require that a candidate for a
party nomination show some support in forty percent of the states. 229
So long, then, as the electoral college remains intact, this requirement
is likely to be protected.

If the electoral college were ever abolished,

such a geographical distribution requisite for subsidy eligibility, absent
a qualification keying it to the actual population of the number of states
required to be represented, would be unconstitutional. 8 0

It is not a

function of population distribution, but of geographical entities. As
such it discriminates against any regional candidacies, whether of particular metropolitan concentrations or of particular regions of the nation.
An Exclusively Monetary Measure for DistributingSubsidy Funds.
The amount of subsidy to which qualified candidates are entitled is determined by the amount of private funds each candidate raises. Under

the particular matching system of allocation incorporated in the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account, a dollar of subsidy is paid
for each dollar privately raised, up to an aggregate ceiling of $250 from
228. Because electoral college votes are determined on a winner-take-all basis, state
by state, the winning candidate will frequently have either a greater or lesser proportion
of the total national popular vote for President than his proportion of votes in the electoral college. More often it is a lesser proportion.
229. Attaching a geographical distribution requirement to minor party eligibility for
public subsidy payments in the general election poses a different issue. See notes 24950 infra and accompanying text. The presidential nomination subsidy will invariably
be used only by candidates for major party nomination. Since the major parties operate
in every state, they do not suffer from a geographical distribution requirement to the
same degree as a minor party which has developed an early following in one or two
states.
230. Even with the electoral college intact, a viable alternative to the twenty-state
minimum would be a requirement that a candidate demonstrate the requisite support in
any group of states whose combined electoral votes exceed forty percent of the national
total. For instance, eight states (California, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Ohio, Michigan, and Florida) can supply more than the needed percentage of electoral
votes, while the twenty smallest states represent only about sixteen percent of the electoral total-less than New York's and California's combined count.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1975:851

any one contributor. 23 ' Basing entitlement to public funds on the
amount of private funds available to a candidate obviously poses the
same kind of questions raised by an exclusively monetary qualification
criterion discussed above.2"2 The issues are sufficiently different, however, to warrant recasting the analysis slightly.
Matching is undeniably attractive as a method of primary subsidy
allocation, and is therefore much more defensible constitutionally than
an exclusively monetary qualification criterion. Its virtues are perhaps
best seen against the background of allocation alternatives to it, the defects of which point up why matching was chosen.
The most obvious allocation principle is one which subsidizes all
candidates who satisfy the qualification criterion equally, whatever it
happens to be. Such a principle rests on the assumption that all candidates who succeed in passing through the eligibility gate are entitled
to a chance to compete in the primary on an equal basis insofar as publicly provided monetary resources are concerned. Moreover, the logic
of an equality allocation principle is consonant with, if not dictated by,
the principal objective of public financing of primaries-the reduction
of contribution-derived disparities between candidates competing for
the same office. Unfortunately, two persuasive factors counter the
theoretical attractiveness of an equality principle. It forces one to subsidize equally all candidates of widely varying degrees of seriousness,
treating the same those several candidates who are the genuine contenders for office and those who stand no chance whatsoever. If the
equal protection clause permitted a fairly high qualification threshold,
it would be feasible to screen out frivolous candidates at the outset.
A difficult qualification test is not constitutionally possible, however, 3
which means that an equality allocation formula will necessarily
"waste" a sizable amount of subsidy funds on candidates who have no
conceivable prospect of winning office.234
Related to this defect is the inevitable candidate-inducement effect of equally allocated public subsidy. Such a subsidy will not only
have to support those candidates who would have run even absent the
231. 1974 Amendments § 408 (codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 9033, 9037).
232. See text accompanying notes 212-22 supra. For a recent conclusion that matching is constitutionally suspect, see Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 126970.
233. See text accompanying notes 212-22 supra.
234. The word "waste" is in quotation marks to emphasize that it is used with some
qualifications. While subsidizing purely publicity-seeking candidates is clearly wasteful,
supporting the candidacies of ideological minorities can enliven and refresh political debate in a variety of ways. The latter is surely not waste.
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availability of public funds, but will incur the added burden of encouraging even more candidates to run because of the availability of such
funds. Unfortunately not all of the candidates so encouraged will be
honest, and the specter of those who might run just for the sake of
getting some of that public subsidy for themselves and their friends
loomed large in the congressional antipathy to an equal allocation prin235
ciple.
If one is not to subsidize all qualified candidates equally, it is
necessary to discover some constitutionally acceptable basis for discriminating among them. The most reasonable basis, and the one most
likely to gain Court favor,230 is one resting on the amount of pre-existing support of candidacy. Two possibilities immediately suggest themselves-one based directly on the number of individual citizens who
indicate their support of a candidacy by signing petitions, and the other
based on the indirect manifestation of citizen support as reflected in
campaign contributions. 37 The former would clearly be preferable
constitutionally, as it is completely unassociated with any wealth criterion. Unfortunately, however, it is not a reliable guide to the size
of public support behind particular candidates, because, as the popular
saying goes, "people will sign anything." Indeed, one guesses that
many citizens, knowing that candidates' subsidy entitlements would be
based on the number of petition signatories, would be inclined to sign
every petition being circulated through the neighborhood, if only to get
rid of a canvasser. While it is certainly feasible to prescribe that a citizen may sign only one candidate's petition, it is difficult to implement
such a restriction. The checking of thousands of names to ensure that
they are on the registration books and that there is no duplication
would be costly in time and money. Moreover, no pure petition signature allocation measure is likely to be regarded by observers, or even
by the signing parties, as anything more than a gratuitous accommodation. Because it is costless to the signer, its validity as a reliable indication of his candidate preferences is not strong.
235. See S. Rep. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974); 120 CONG. RFc. S. 4558
(daily ed. Mar. 27, 1974) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
236. There is language scattered through Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968),

and Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), approving preexisting support as a basis
for ballot access. See id. at 442. There is no reason to think that a distribution principle which is acceptable for so sensitive a function would be unacceptable as a guide
for subsidy allocation.
237. It would be entirely possible, of course, to use other citizen-support measures.
A less troublesome version of one based on contributions would use the number of contributors rather than the amount they contributed.
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There is one additional variant of this last differential allocation
mechanism that deserves mention-a voucher system. The use of vouchers, the advantages of which have been ably urged by David Adamany and George Agree, 233 and embodied in legislation by Senator
Lee Metcalf, 239 would entirely finesse the need for a government
agency to use any allocation principle at all. By mailing a voucher redeemable for a stipulated sum to each registered voter, or every person
of voting age who has a social security number, for example, citizen
choice could operate directly to allocate the available subsidy funds.
Moreover, such allocation decisions are not costless, because a citizen
has only one voucher to give. But a voucher system has its problems,
240
too, which discourage its use.

Against the background of these alternatives, an exclusively matching allocation principle's simplicity is indeed appealing. By shifting to
individual contributors the burden of making the crucial decision of
how much subsidy a candidate is to receive, matching allocation avoids
the need for any governmental allocation rules or decision.
But is it constitutional? In light of the discussion above,241 one
must reluctantly conclude that it is not. Making the amount of private
funds raised the sole determinant of the amount of public funds to be
received inherently frustrates attainment of the primary reason for having a subsidy in the first instance-diminishing the dependence of political candidacy upon access to private wealth. To the extent that subsidy entitlement is determined by matching, candidates without access
to private funds will continue to be discouraged from running at all,
and candidates with access to only limited private funds will continue
to be at a disadvantage in competition with their well-heeled rivals.
It should be recalled that these are two of the three principal governmental interests which are offered as justification for most campaign
finance reform, including public subsidization, and against which all attempts to achieve them must be measured. Consequently, any sub238. D. ADAmANY & G. AGREE, MoNEY AND
UNrIED STATES 189-92, 196-201 (1975).

PoLmcs:

CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE

239. S. 1390, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see 113 CONG. REC. 8006 (1967).
240. A voucher system is very costly to administer, with estimates as high as $50
million for administration expenses alone. D. ADAMANY & G. AGRE supra note 238,
at 201. It also is inherently favorable to candidates who are friendly to the interests of
huge groups, whether organized or not, such as labor and students, which have ready
manpower for collecting the vouchers. Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine that a
market in vouchers might develop, with politically active citizens collecting or buying
the vouchers of friends, or with apolitical citizens selling their vouchers to candidates

at a discount price.
241. See notes 212-22 supra and accompanying text.
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sidy plan which frustrates them must be said to fail the test of constitutionality.
This particular matching formula is pernicious in addition because
of the comparatively high level of the matching ceiling. A $250
matching ceiling favors large contributors and uses public funds to reinforce their candidate choices. A plan which embodies the raising of
large-size contributions of money both as the exclusive mode of determining eligibility in the first place and of allocating subsidy entitlement to those who qualify must fail doubly.
This does not mean, however, that a matching allocation principle
cannot be used at all, but only that it cannot be used exclusively. As
was the case with the eligibility-determining mechanism, the allocation mechanism could be substantially cured by the addition of an
equally distributed subsidy in a small amount to all candidates who pass
the qualification hurdle. Such a subsidy-at perhaps the level of onehalf cent per person of voting age, which would amount to $700,000
for each qualifying candidate in the 1976 presidential election-would
be sufficient to enable every qualifying candidate to get his campaign
off the ground, and to acquire sufficient public exposure if his qualifications prove to be attractive to the public to generate the additional private contributions needed to run an adequate campaign. By providing
such a floor to all qualifying candidates, it would be possible both to
diminish candidate deterrence and to alleviate somewhat the most severe
disparities arising out of differential candidate access to private funds.
Moreover, the cost of supplementing matching with an equally
distributed low-level subsidy could be substantially recovered by lowering the size of private contributions which would be matched. If, for
example, only the first $125 of any individual's aggregate contribution were matched, the cost of the matching component could be cut
by between one-quarter and two-fifths, depending on the size distribution of all contributions to be matched.24 2 By itself, a reduction in the
matching ceiling would alleviate the equal protection concern over public subsidization of candidate choices of wealthy contributors. A lower
ceiling would not be as objectionable in principle, and, on balance,
242. This is merely a guess, because it is not yet known to what extent the availability of matching is going to induce private citizens to contribute more than they would
have without the enticement of the subsidy. If all the contributions of a presidential
candidate were at the matching ceiling of $250, obviously a reduction of the ceiling to
$125 would cut the costs of matching in half. But not all contributions will be at the
$250 level.
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Taking both

these steps-adding an equally distributed subsidy and reducing the
level of the matching ceiling-would greatly increase the likelihood

that the plan will be found to be constitutional. If, in addition, the
maximum size of individual qualifying contributions were similarly reduced,243 the minimum number of required contributors correspondingly increased, 244 and a petition signature alternative added as suggested above, 245 the constitutionality of the presidential primary election subsidy could be assured.
The General Election PresidentialSubsidy: Discriminatory
Treatment of Minorand New Parties

The present formula for subsidizing minor and new parties was
enacted in 1971 as part of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act,2

0

and has been discussed elsewhere. 247 The only serious constitu-

tional question arises from the requirement that a minor party receive
five percent of the vote, either in the preceding or present general election, in order to be eligible for any presidential general election subsidy. Because common sense requires, and the Court permits, 2 8 dis-

crimination between major and minor parties in some respects, the sole
issue is whether the five percent threshold is a reasonable cut-off point.
While the problem could be eliminated entirely by extending the minor

party subsidy entitlement to parties obtaining as little as one percent of
the vote, it is most unlikely that the Court would second-guess Congress on a judgmental matter of so small a degree, particularly when
243. Other than pure symmetry, there is no particular necessity for equating the qualifying contribution ceiling and the matching ceiling. One could easily keep the former
at $250, while reducing the latter to $125, which would simply mean that only half of
the qualifying contribution would be matched with public funds.
244. Increasing the number of required contributors would probably help allay candidate-inducement fears created by the addition of an equally distributed subsidy component. See note 235 supra and accompanying text.
245. See notes 221-22 supra and accompanying text. The addition of a petition signature alternative as a mode of qualifying for the subsidy would alone be enough to save
the present eligibility-determining mechanism, irrespective of the amount of the qualifying contribution ceiling. The amount of that ceiling, however, would undoubtedly bear
strongly on the Court's examination of the subsidy plan as a whole, see Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968), especially when the raising of money in large contributions plays such an important part throughout. A reduction in the qualifying contribution ceiling, therefore, might very well help to sustain the constitutionality of a matching allocation principle.
246. Revenue Act §§ 801-02, amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 9001-13.
247. Public Financing at 397-402; see Rosenthal, supra note 121, at 414-15; Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 1121-51.
248. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 441-42 (1971).
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the public would undoubtedly view subsidization of tiny parties as utterly wasteful and absurd. Assuming equality of subsidy entitlement
among major and minor parties is not required, the act treats minor
parties in a non-discriminatory fashion and the five percent threshold
is probably constitutional.
Related to this is an additional threshold burden on minor parties,
the requirement that a minor party candidate, in order to qualify for
the general election subsidy, be on the ballot in at least ten states.2 49
Such a provision penalizes minor parties which are just forming, and
which characteristically begin in one or two states and spread in subsequent years to other states. Unless they qualify for the ballot in ten
states, minor party candidates receive nothing at all, which cannot help
but burden their development and growth. One must wonder whether
it is constitutional to add to the five percent vote threshold this even
more burdensome ten-state geographical threshold. While one or the
other, standing alone, might pass constitutional muster, it is difficult to
justify both together. 50
It has been suggested that reimbursement of new parties after the
election is an unconstitutional discrimination. 251 No reasonable alternative to post-election reimbursement is conceivable for new parties,
however, since they were not in existence during the preceding election, when some measure of their support could have been obtained.
Consequently the Court is not likely to strike down a public subsidy
plan which does the best possible for new parties, even if after the election.
Party-FavoringExpenditure Ceilings

Permitting state and national party committees each to make expenditures in behalf of their party's candidates for Congress 252 and the
presidency25 3 beyond the expenditure limitation on the candidates
themselves unquestionably discriminates against independent candidates. No conceivable justification can be advanced in support of such
blatant discrimination in favor of party candidates, and the provision
is clearly unconstitutional.
249. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9002(2)(B).
250. For an argument that the geographical limitation alone is constitutionally suspect, see Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 1268-69.
251. See Brief for Plaintiff at 175-83, Buckley v. Valeo, Civil No. 75-1061 (D.C. Cir.

filed June 2, 1975).
252. 1974 Amendments § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f)(1)).
253. Id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(f)(2)).
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION

A final major constitutional question is raised by the peculiar appointment process the Amendments prescribe for the Federal Election
Commission. While Article I of the Constitution undoubtedly gives
Congress the authority to establish new federal agencies,2 54 to define
the qualifications of those who may be appointed to positions in those
agencies, and even perhaps to designate the specific person who may

be appointed to a particular position, 255 it seems clear that Article 112"
requires that the actual appointment be made by the President, in

whom the Constitution vests the power of appointment. The 1974
Amendments, however, in addition to permitting the President to appoint two members of the eight-member Commission, require that two
other members be appointed by the President pro25tempore
of the Sen7
ate and two appointed by the Speaker of the House.
A careful search of precedents has turned up no other federal
agency similarly constituted, and the present arrangement must be regarded as unconstitutional. As is the case with so many features of
the Amendments, the substance of this arrangement could have been
attained with more care in the drafting. So long as the President formally appoints, it is entirely permissible for the Congress to specify a
nomination procedure, such as that intended by the 1974 Amendments, which would be binding on the President.258
There are other questions about the constitutionality of specific
Commission powers-such as the power to disqualify individuals from
running for federal office for periods of up to seven years 259 which
254. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
255. See E. CoRwIN, THE CONSTITuTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doe. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1964), cited
in Hearings on Various Measures Relating to Federal Election Reform Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections and the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 352-53 (1973).
256. And he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments. U.S. CONST. art. H1, § 2, cls. 2, 3.
257. 1974 Amendments § 310(a) (1) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (1)).
258. E. CoRwIN, supra note 255.
259. 1974 Amendments § 302 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 456). The disqualification begins on the date of the Commission finding, after notice and hearing on the record, that
a candidate failed to file a required report, and extends to one year after the expiration
of the term of the office for which the person was a candidate. Thus, for the House,
the penalty could be as much as three years; for the presidency, five years; and for the
Senate, seven years.
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are beyond the scope of this Article. Many of them, however, pose
serious issues which merit careful exploration.
CONCLUSION

The issues generated by campaign finance legislation are among
the most basic that the Supreme Court ever confronts. The nation's
ultimate political decision-making structure is involved, and crucial constitutional rights are at stake. The only persuasive ground upon which
the Court might rest a decision to sustain the most flawed features
of the 1974 Amendments is the need to respect the congressional response to Watergate and thereby avoid further erosion of public confidence in government. When weighed against the faults of the Amendments, and the fact that they are likely to govern campaign finance for
decades to come if sustained, that need is not terribly convincing. Far
more important than an immediate response to Watergate is a constitutionally sound response. The burden of reacting to Watergate is
properly on Congress-not the Supreme Court-as is also the burden
of repairing these statutes. If the Court finds defects in the new laws,
one must hope that it will give Congress some guidance in the ensuing
task of remodeling a basically sound structure.

